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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-

POLICE

INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND WHEN TO
DETERMINE HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCHUNITED STATES V JACQUES, 744 F.3D 804 (1ST
CIR. 2014).
If a defendant moves to suppress evidence via his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, which prohibits courts from
admitting a defendant's involuntary confession, and that confession was
voluntary, then that confession is not protected by the Fifth Amendment.'
United States v. Jacques2 addresses the various types of coercive methods
used by police to induce a confession out of a suspect, and how far they can
go before infringing upon a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against an
involuntary confession.' The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that the police did not infringe upon the defendant's Fifth
Amendment right against an involuntary confession.4
On November 5, 2008, after Barack Obama was elected to be the
next President of the United States, a church with a predominantly AfricanAmerican congregation was burned down in Springfield, Massachusetts.5
A task force compromised of the ATF, FBI, Springfield P.D., and the
Massachusetts State Police was convened later; the task force received a tip
that Michael Jacques ("Jacques") and another man had been bragging about
their involvement in the church arson.6 The task force made an effort to
catch Jacques making these statements, and when it did, proceeded to

1

See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also 42 GEO L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 215-16 (2013)

("To determine if a defendant's statements were involuntary, a court must ask whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, law enforcement officials obtained the evidence by overbearing the
will of the accused. This inquiry centers upon: (1) the conduct of law enforcement officials in

creating pressure and (2) the suspect's capacity to resist that pressure.").
2

744 F.3d 804 (1st Cir. 2014).

3 See Jacques, 744 F.3d at 808-12 (determining mention of family member not coercive

enough to violate Fifth Amendment).
4 See id at 809-12 (noting police did not overbear defendant's will).
' See id at 807 ("The National Response Team for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) concluded that the fire was deliberately set and that gasoline had
been used to ignite the building. It subsequently convened a joint task force with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Springfield Police Department, and the Massachusetts State
Police (MSP) to investigate the incident.").
6 See id at 807.
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detain and to transport him for interrogation.7
Over the course of the interrogation, the officers employed various
interrogation tactics from the "Reid technique." 8 Jacques continued to
deny his involvement, despite knowing his right to end the interrogation. 9
After six hours of intense questioning, Jacques admitted to his involvement
in the church arson. 1 Following his arraignment, Jacques moved to
suppress his incriminating statements and argued that his confession was
involuntary due to the officer's coercive tactics that had overbome his
will.ii The district court denied Jacques' motion to suppress, and upon
appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the decision.12
The Fifth Amendment prohibits a court from admitting a
defendant's involuntary confession of self-incrimination into evidence.i3
Many cases have risen out of a defendant's request to suppress evidence for
Fifth Amendment reasons, especially when the defendant made a coerced
confession. 14 For instance, in Oregon v.Elstad,the defendant confessed to
7 See id.

8 See Jacques, 744 F.3d at 808 n.1

("The 'Reid technique' is a method of interrogation

pioneered by John E. Reid and Associates, aimed at extracting confessions and evaluating suspect
credibility."). "[The officers] exaggerated the strength of the evidence against Jacques,
misrepresented the involvement of high-profile federal agents in the case, minimized the
magnitude of Jacques's alleged criminal conduct, interrupted Jacques's attempts to deny his guilt,
and suggested that Jacques's continued resistance would subject him to more damning media
coverage." Id.at 808.
9 See id at 808 (noting Jacques claimed his incriminating statements were merely attempt to
make himself "look bigger").
10 See id (explaining Jacques confessed because he felt [officer] Mazza was honest and
proved charges against him). Jacques "was ultimately charged with conspiracy against civil
rights inviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, damage or destruction to religious real property inviolation
of 18 U.S.C. § 247(c), and use of a fire to commit a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844

(h)(1)." Id.
11 See id (describing Jacques' arguments in moving to suppress his incriminating
statements).
12 See id at 807-09 (detailing procedural history). Jacques was convicted on allcharges and
subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. See id at 809.
13 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) ("A free and voluntary
confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest
sense of guilt ... but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture
of fear, comes in so questionable a shape... that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it
is rejected.").
14 See Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 577 (Tex.Crim. App.2010) (describing circuit
split
regarding whether threatening to arrest family member renders confession involuntary); see
also United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding confession
involuntary where officer told defendant he wasn't pursuing charges contradicting earlier
Mirandawarnings); Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998) (declaring confession
voluntary even though officer lied about fingerprint evidence found in victim's home); United
States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 407 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating confession voluntary despite police
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a burglary charge and later asked for a motion to suppress his incriminating
statements, claiming that the police coerced his testimony out of him.' 5
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the defendant's
confession was voluntary and rendered admissible. 16 The Court reasoned

that the finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the
entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the
voluntariness of the defendant's statements; here, the surrounding
circumstances and police conduct did not conclude any coercive means.17
In Procunierv. Atchley, an inmate made an involuntary statement
of self-incrimination and requested a motion to suppress the evidence.' 8
The Supreme Court held that the evidence was wrongly admitted in trial
and that it was an involuntary confession; further the Court found a new
trial to be unnecessary. 19 The Court reasoned that the question of whether
the defendant's will is overborne, so that the statement was not his free and
voluntary act, the constitutionality of the statement must be resolved in
light of the totality of the circumstances, and in this case the defendant's
20
will was not overborne, making the evidence admissible in court.
Subsequently in United States v. Rojas-Tapia, the defendant
claimed that he did not knowingly or voluntarily confess to his involvement

officer falsely assuring defendant no danger of prosecution existed); United States v. Swint, 15
F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Swint was not given Miranda warnings; Swint's attorney was not
present when the statements were made; the statements were made in the District Attorney's
office in the courthouse; and the officers present were armed with their weapons clearly visible.
Thus, exercising plenary review, we hold that Swint's statements on May 2, 1991, were
involuntary."); Luckhart v. State, 736 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2000) (deception is "not conclusive"
but "weighs heavily" against finding of voluntariness).
15 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 302 (1985) (arguing later statement at police station
constituted "fruit of the poisonous tree").
16 See id.at 303-04 ("A second metaphor questions whether a confession can be truly
voluntary once the 'cat is out of the bag.' Taken out of context, each of these metaphors can be
misleading. They should not be used to obscure fundamental differences between the role of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the function of Miranda in guarding against the
prosecutorial use of compelled statements as prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.").
17 See id. at 315-18 (reasoning neither environment nor circumstances of interrogations were
coercive in nature).
18 See Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 447 (1971) ("They asked him if he would be
willing to have his next conversation with the respondent electronically recorded, and, since he
planned to return to get additional information for the insurance company, he agreed. Later the
same day Travers returned to the jail and had another conversation with the respondent, in the
course of which the respondent again gave Travers substantially the same account of the
circumstances of his wife's death. This conversation was recorded. Over the objection of
defense counsel, the recording of the second conversation was admitted in evidence at the trial.").
19 See id. at 454.
20 See id.
(detailing Court reasoning in finding confession involuntary).
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in a hijacking. 2'
The First Circuit held that he voluntarily gave his
confession. 22 The court reasoned that his intellectual limitations did not
result in a confession that was other than knowing, based on the fact that
his confession was lucid and articulate. 23
Similarly, in United States v. Sanchez, the defendant moved to
suppress incriminating involuntary statements made to law enforcement
under the guise of the Fifth Amendment.24 The defendant, a minor, was
suspected of assault and was brought into the police station for
questioning.2 5 The Eight Circuit held that the defendant's will was not
overbome by improper police conduct, and that the evidence was
admissible in court.2 6 The court ruled that a totality of the circumstances
review needs to be considered when determining if a suspect's will is
overbome and elicits an involuntary confession.27 The court affirmed the
earlier finding that the defendant was of "average intelligence," and further
noted that no evidence existed suggesting that the defendant was mentally
or physically unhealthy. 28 The court also reasoned that the short duration
of the interrogation, combined with the district court's finding that the
defendant's demonstrated his ability to resist the pressure to confess at the
beginning of the interview, undermined the conclusion that his mental
immaturity led to an invalid confession.29

21

United States v. Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Several hours into this

detention, while police were asking routine booking questions, Rojas-Tapia abruptly stated that
he wanted to tell them about his participation in the hijacking. Although the police reminded
Rojas-Tapia that he had the right to counsel and to remain silent, he proceeded to make a detailed
inculpatory statement.").
22 See id. at 8-10.
23 See id.
at 10 (finding confession voluntary despite mental capabilities of defendant); see
also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding coercive police action necessary to
render confession involuntary). But see Commonwealth v. Cephas, 522 A.2d 63, 65 (Pa. Super
Ct. 1987) (distinguishing waiver invalid when mental illness precludes defendant's
understanding).
24 United States v. Sanchez, 614 F.3d 876, 877 (2010).
25 See id. at 877-81.
26 See id. at 888.
27 See id.
at 882-83. The court evaluated the defendant's maturity, education, physical
condition, and mental aptitude in determining his voluntary confession. See id.
at 887.
28 Id. at 887-88.
29 See Sanchez, 614 F.3d at 888; see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-71 (1986)
(stating no issue of voluntariness when suspect's mental illness draws confession); United States
v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 80-81 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Statements obtained from defendant during the
immigration interview were voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. The defendant was a welleducated, mature adult of 40 years, who had a general familiarity with the American legal system
and was in good health."); United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 659 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding valid waiver because defendant was not impaired by alcohol or drugs during interview);
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However, in Brown v. Mississippi, a defendant was brutally and
violently beaten and coerced into a confession of murder.3 0 The Supreme
Court held that the defendant's confession was involuntary and violated his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 3' The Court reasoned

that use of a confession obtained by coercion, brutality, and violence is not
a valid basis for conviction and sentence constituted denial of due
32
process.
With regard to Jacques, defendant claimed officers used coercive
United States v. Turner, 157 F.3d 552, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding valid waiver even though
defendant ingested PCP and demonstrated awareness of his rights); United States v. Paredes, 139
F.3d 840, 844 (11th Cir. 1998) (claiming valid waiver because defendant had requisite mental
capacity regardless of police tactics); Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 751-52 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding mildly mentally handicapped person validly waived rights after explained in simple
terms); United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding valid waiver by
defendant with attention and learning disabilities); United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 550 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("[S]uspect's broken shoulder and other accident-related injuries did not invalidate
waiver; officer confirmed with hospital that suspect was not under influence of judgmentimpairing medication."); Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1288-1289 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
waiver where defendant had low I.Q. because of age, police contact and Miranda rights);
Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating valid waiver despite defendant
undergoing surgery and ingesting pain medication because records showed alertness); Wernert v.
Am, 819 F.2d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding ingestion of drugs and alcohol day before
confession did not invalidate confession); State v. Thornton, 83 So. 3d 1024 (La. 2012) ("The
trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress on grounds that intoxication rendered
her statements to policy involuntary because a valid waiver of Miranda rights was not a
prerequisite for admitting her otherwise voluntary statements into evidence. The officers used no
coercive measures in securing her statements."). But see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399400 (1978) ("[C]onfession in hospital involuntary because defendant connected to at least 6 tubes,
repeatedly requested presence of counsel, complained of excruciating pain, and nodded off at
various times during 4-hour interrogation."); United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir.
2014) ("Use at trial of intellectually disabled 18-year-old's confession violated Due Process
Clause because circumstances including defendant's severe intellectual impairment, repetitive
questioning, deception as to use of statement, suggestive questioning, and false promises of
leniency and confidentiality established that statement was involuntary."); United States v.
Taylor, 736 F.3d 661 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Court improperly admitted defendant's post-arrest
statements because his statements were not voluntarily made since he was impaired throughout
his interrogation, and his interrogators took undue advantage of that impairment by continuing to
question him."); Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[I]nvalid waiver by mentally
handicapped defendant because record demonstrated he could not understand complex waivers
and consequences, and police failed to take extra precautions."); Commonwealth v. Cephas, 522
A.2d 63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (stating defendant's mental illness precludes him from
understanding Miranda warnings, and waiver obtained is invalid).
30 Brownv. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
31 See id.
32 See id.at 286-87 (finding constitutional violation due to police tactics in obtaining
confession); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (upholding confession given
defendant's inchoate treatment for bullet wounds). But see United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F.
Supp. 2d 338, 373-74 (E.D. Va. 2005) (finding admissible confession despite defendant's
allegations that confession was given after torture).
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interrogation techniques that overbore his will in violation of the Fifth

Amendment.3 3 With regards to the officers threatening a harsher sentence
in exchange for Jacques's cooperation, the court held that it had no impact
on Jacques's conduct during the interrogation.34
Next, the court analyzed whether the officer's reference to the
defendant's father's health manifested any psychological or emotional

anxiety in response to the officer's statements.3 5 The court held that the
defendant did not manifest any notable psychological or emotional
response that would indicate that he was susceptible to manipulation.3 6
Finally, the court analyzed the defendant's claims that his will was
overbome through the officers' use of the "Reid technique," such as
exaggerating their evidence and minimizing the gravity of his suspected
offense in obtaining a confession.3 7 The court held that the techniques fell
United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804, 809 (1st Cir. 2014).
See id. at 811; see also United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating
defendant identified threat of retaliation as reasons for confession). But see United States v.
Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (asserting confession suppressed because officers had used
defendant's young daughter to coerce statement); Williams v. State, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 46 (2000)
(stating slightest threat or promise of lenience renders confession inadmissible); Beavers v. State,
998 P.2d 1040, 1044-1046 (Alaska 2000) ("[W]here there is a promise of lenience, that is one
factor in assessing voluntariness; but threats are closer to a per se rule of exclusion."); Bisbee v.
State, 17 S.W. 3d 477, 481 (Ark. 2000) (rendering promise of lenience invalidates waiver if
promise induced waiver); State v. Luke, 1 P.3d 795, 799 (Idaho 2000) (stating promise of
lenience does not invalidate waiver; court focuses on whether there was deception); Buster v.
Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 157 (Ky. 2012) ("The trial court erred by denying defendant's
motion to suppress her written confession because the police did not scrupulously honor her right
to cuff off questioning, as social worker and officer attempted to persuade defendant to reconsider
her invocation of her right by allowing social worker to speak with defendant alone for half an
hour.").
35 See Jacques, 744 F.3d at 812; see also United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 242 (1st
Cir. 1990) ("[Clircuit refused to find that a defendant's confession was involuntary on the basis of
police officers' threats to charge his sister with a crime if he did not cooperate."); United States v.
Jobin, 535 F.2d 154, 159 (1st Cir. 1976) (stating mere use of psychological pressure by agents
does not necessarily render confession involuntary). But see Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528,
534 (1963) ("[Tlhe petitioner's oral confession was made only after the police had told her that
state financial aid for her infant children would be cut off, and her children taken from her, if she
did not 'cooperate,' . . . a confession made under such circumstances must be deemed not
voluntary.").
36 See Jacques, 744 F.3d at 812. But see Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S.
68 (1949)
(finding confession involuntary based upon number of circumstances including threat to arrest
suspect's mother); Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1336 (describing interrogation objective was to create fear
when suspect was denied seeing child); Brisbon v. United States, 957 A.2d 931, 945 (D.C. App.
2008) ("[O]fficers falsely told suspect that mother and grandmother had been arrested, cautioning
that the kind of deception employed here, involving supposed harm to vulnerable family
members, could well cross the line beyond the type of tactics vel non that a court will tolerate.").
37 See Jacques, 744 F.3d at 812; see also United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 439 (1st
Cir. 2011) ("Some aggravated types of deception or chicanery by the police may be sufficient to
33
34
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safely within the realm of the permissible 'chicanery' sanctioned by
courts 8 The court concluded that the officers' interrogative tactics did not
amount to coercion in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment

rights .39
While the court analyzed the various interrogation techniques of
the officers in a systematic manner, the question of determining how far
officers should go during an interrogation, presents itself 40 Although the
"Reid technique" is aimed at extracting confessions and evaluating suspect
credibility, there should be a limit on how extreme the extracting
techniques are allowed to be .41 Exaggerating the strength of the evidence
against the defendant, misrepresenting the involvement of high-profile
federal agents in the case, minimizing the magnitude of the defendant's
alleged criminal conduct, and interrupting the defendant's attempts 42to deny
his guilt all seem to be on the extreme end of extracting techniques.
The court decided that just because the defendant did not exude
any physical reaction, once the officers mentioned his father's health, it did
not affect him in making an involuntary confession.43 Physical reactions or
visible emotional anxiety should not be the only measure to examine if the
mentioning of a family member affected a person; specifically since many
suspects of a crime may admit to whatever the police officer wants to hear,
just to get back to their family. 44 Additionally, tactics that raise issues that
are irrelevant to the questioning of the criminal act should not be allowed,
rendering the suspect psychologically weak and susceptible to any type of
questioning.45
While the holding is not a complete departure from existing law, it
is an element of the criminal process worth analyzing.4 6 Although police
officers must have certain interrogation tools at their disposal in order to

render a confession involuntary. But the use of chicanery does not automatically undermine the
voluntariness of a confession ....[S]ome degree of deception on their part during the questioning
of a suspect is permissible.") (internal citations omitted).
38 Jacques,744 F.3d at 812.
39 See id.

See supra notes 33-38 (detailing court's reasoning in finding Jacques' confession was
made voluntarily).
41 See Jacques,744 F.3d at 808.
42 See id. at 808 n.8 (describing "Reid technique").
43 See United States v. Sanchez, 614 F.3d 876, 877 (2010).
44 See cases cited supra notes 35-36 (citing cases involving psychological pressure where
officers threaten defendant's family).
45 See cases cited supra notes 35-36 (illustrating how police tactics unrelated to suspected
40

crime canbe coercive).
46

See sources cited supra note 1 (outlining protections of Fifth Amendment).
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nudge a suspect into assuming it best to confess, the question arises of how
much leverage is permissible until it infringes on a suspect's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination via an involuntary
confession. 47 Future litigation may reasonably be anticipated on this
specific step of the criminal procedure, delving into the question of how far
is too far when police use various interrogation techniques. 48 While
currently there is a circuit split on leniency courts will allow police officers
during their interrogational techniques, eventually the Supreme Court will
have to make definite guidelines that officers will need to follow, so as not
49
to abuse their authoritative powers.
In United States v. Jacques, the court addresses the various types of
coercive methods used by police to get a confession out of a suspect, and
how far they can go before infringing upon a suspect's Fifth Amendment
right against an involuntary confession. 50 Although the court did not
completely depart from existing law, questions still arise as to how much
power police should really be given with regard to their interrogation
techniques.
Anjali M. Chhatre

Cf United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding officers' use of
defendant's young child as leverage impermissible).
48 See cases cited supra note 14 (outlining various cases determining issue of what
constitutes permissible police interrogation tactics).
49 See cases cited supra note 29 (illustrating circuit split).
50 United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804 (1st Cir. 2014).
47

